AI Development Index: How AI Grew, 1950–2026
A year-by-year record of how artificial intelligence developed, in six measures: training compute, capability, cost, capital, adoption and risk. Every value is dated, sourced and confidence-rated, and the full dataset is free to download.
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- The largest estimated AI training run grew from about 40 operations for Claude Shannon’s maze-solving mouse in 1950 to about 9.4×10²⁶ for OpenAI’s GPT-6 Astra in September 2026, according to Epoch AI.
- Epoch AI estimates frontier language-model training compute has grown about 5× a year since 2020, and the cost of those runs about 3.5× a year.
- Capability tests are saturating within one to two years of launch: SWE-bench Verified went from 49% to 97.0% between late 2024 and September 2026.
- The cheapest GPT-4-level model cost $37.50 per million tokens in March 2023 and about $0.20 in October 2026.
- Global corporate AI investment, in constant 2021 dollars, rose from about $17 billion in 2013 to $490 billion in 2025 (Our World in Data, from the Stanford HAI AI Index).
- Reported AI incidents in the AI Incident Database rose from 233 in 2024 to 362 in 2025, as cited by the AI Index 2026.
Download the data (CSV) · every table and exhibit on this page, with sources and confidence ratings. Free to quote with attribution and a link.
- Decade by decade — Every decade since 1950 raised the record for the largest training run except one: the 1970s, the decade of the first AI winter
- 1. Compute — Training compute: from 10⁶ FLOP for the Perceptron to about 10²⁷ for today’s frontier
- 2. Capability — Capability: benchmarks rise from near zero to saturation in one to five years
- 3. Cost — Cost: buying a fixed capability gets cheaper every year, while building the frontier gets dearer
- 4. Capital — Capital: corporate AI investment rose about 29-fold in real terms from 2013 to 2025
- 5. Adoption and research output — Adoption: from a specialist tool to a billion weekly users
- 6. Risk and resources — Risk and resources: incidents and electricity use are rising, but are the least complete series
- Register — The milestone register: 70 dated events from 1943 to 2026
- FAQ
- Definitions
- About the data
This index tracks AI’s development through six measures that can be dated and sourced across decades, rather than through a single composite score. Composite indices hide their weights; separate measures let readers see that capability, cost and adoption have moved at very different speeds. The companion report, How AI Developed, 1950–2026, tells the story; this page holds the numbers.
The clearest long-run signal is compute. Epoch AI’s database of notable models shows the largest training run of each year rising by about 25 orders of magnitude since 1950, with a sharp change of pace around 2010: before then compute doubled roughly every 20 months, in line with general computing, and afterwards about every six months. Since 2020 the largest language-model runs have grown about 5× a year. The record in November 2026 is Epoch’s estimate of about 9.4×10²⁶ FLOP for GPT-6 Astra, roughly 45 times GPT-4.
Cost and capability have moved in opposite directions for buyers and builders. For buyers, a fixed level of capability gets dramatically cheaper: GPT-4-level output fell about 187-fold in price between March 2023 and October 2026. For builders, the frontier gets dearer: Epoch’s amortised estimate for the final training run of Grok 4 is about $390 million, against about $16 for AlexNet in 2012. Capital has followed the builders, with corporate AI investment rising about 29-fold in real terms from 2013 to 2025.
Adoption and risk measures are younger and less consistent. McKinsey’s survey shows organisational use rising from 20% of respondents in 2017 to 89% in 2026, and ChatGPT passed 1 billion weekly users in August 2026. Incident counts are rising too, but they record what is reported, not what happens, and the main public database could not be fully refreshed for this edition.
- Compute is the longest consistent series: about 25 orders of magnitude from 1950 to 2026 in Epoch AI’s largest-run-of-the-year data.
- Growth sped up around 2010, from a 20-month doubling to roughly 6 months, and has run at about 5× a year for frontier language models since 2020.
- A fixed capability gets cheaper fast; the newest frontier stays expensive to build and to buy.
- Investment is cyclical even in this boom: corporate AI investment fell in 2022 and 2023 before more than doubling in 2025.
- Compare like with like: weekly and monthly users, cloud-rental and amortised costs, and current and constant dollars are kept separate here.
Every decade since 1950 raised the record for the largest training run except one: the 1970s, the decade of the first AI winter
The scoreboard below is generated from the dataset: for each decade it shows the eras it spanned, the largest training run in Epoch AI’s notable-models data, how that record compares with the previous decade’s, and the landmark events in our milestone register.
View the data
| Largest training run of the year | |
|---|---|
| 1950 | 40 |
| 1957 | 6.9×10⁵ |
| 1959 | 6×10⁸ |
| 1960 | 7.2×10⁸ |
| 1962 | 1.6×10⁶ |
| 1963 | 2.2×10⁷ |
| 1965 | 1.1×10⁶ |
| 1966 | 1.1×10⁸ |
| 1975 | 5.2×10⁶ |
| 1980 | 2.7×10⁸ |
| 1983 | 3.2×10⁸ |
| 1986 | 6.7×10⁸ |
| 1987 | 2.8×10¹⁰ |
| 1988 | 3×10⁸ |
| 1989 | 1.5×10¹² |
| 1990 | 7.9×10¹⁰ |
| 1991 | 7.5×10¹⁰ |
| 1992 | 1.8×10¹³ |
| 1993 | 1.3×10¹³ |
| 1994 | 1.9×10¹³ |
| 1995 | 2×10¹¹ |
| 1996 | 8.8×10¹¹ |
| 1997 | 3.2×10¹³ |
| 1998 | 2.8×10¹² |
| 1999 | 8×10¹² |
| 2000 | 6.3×10¹⁵ |
| 2001 | 6.3×10¹³ |
| 2003 | 1.7×10¹⁵ |
| 2004 | 2.8×10¹⁵ |
| 2005 | 1.2×10¹⁴ |
| 2006 | 7.5×10¹⁴ |
| 2007 | 1.4×10¹⁸ |
| 2008 | 1.6×10⁹ |
| 2009 | 4.2×10¹⁵ |
| 2010 | 5.4×10¹⁶ |
| 2011 | 5.2×10¹⁶ |
| 2012 | 6×10¹⁷ |
| 2013 | 2.6×10¹⁸ |
| 2014 | 3×10²⁰ |
| 2015 | 3.8×10²⁰ |
| 2016 | 6.6×10²¹ |
| 2017 | 8.4×10²⁰ |
| 2018 | 8.7×10²¹ |
| 2019 | 1.1×10²³ |
| 2020 | 3.1×10²³ |
| 2021 | 2×10²⁴ |
| 2022 | 2.7×10²⁴ |
| 2023 | 5×10²⁵ |
| 2024 | 3.8×10²⁵ |
| 2025 | 5×10²⁶ |
| 2026 | 9.4×10²⁶ |
Notes: Each point is the year’s largest estimated run among Epoch’s notable models; years with no notable model are skipped. Estimates carry Epoch confidence ratings; the 2026 value is rated ‘Likely’.REPORTAI report-ai.org
Two readings stand out. The 1970s record (about 5×10⁶ FLOP) sits below the 1960s one, the first AI winter showing up in the data. And the decade multiples are uneven because a single unusual model can set a decade’s record; Epoch’s fitted growth rates, in the compute section below, are the better guide to the trend. The 2020s figure covers 2020 to November 2026 only.
The decade scoreboard
| Decade | Era(s) | Largest estimated training run | Change on previous decade | Landmarks | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1950s | Foundations, Early optimism | 6×10⁸ FLOP (Pandemonium (morse), 1959) | — | Turing’s ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’; Dartmouth proposal coins ‘artificial intelligence’; Dartmouth Summer Research Project; Rosenblatt’s perceptron unveiled | DERIVED |
| 1960s | Early optimism | 7.2×10⁸ FLOP (Perceptron (1960), 1960) | ×1.2 | Shakey the robot (SRI); ELIZA; Mansfield Amendment and ‘Perceptrons’ | DERIVED |
| 1970s | Early optimism, First AI winter | 5.2×10⁶ FLOP (Cognitron, 1975) | lower (÷139) | Lighthill report; DARPA cuts AI funding | DERIVED |
| 1980s | Expert-systems boom, Second AI winter | 1.5×10¹² FLOP (Zip CNN, 1989) | ×2.9×10⁵ | R1/XCON at Digital Equipment Corporation; Japan’s Fifth Generation project (ICOT); Backpropagation popularised; Lisp-machine market collapses; NETtalk | DERIVED |
| 1990s | Second AI winter, Statistical machine learning | 3.2×10¹³ FLOP (LSTM, 1997) | ×21.1 | Deep Blue beats Kasparov; LSTM; LeNet-5 | DERIVED |
| 2000s | Statistical machine learning | 1.4×10¹⁸ FLOP (SB-LM, 2007) | ×4.6×10⁴ | DARPA Grand Challenge won; Deep belief nets | DERIVED |
| 2010s | Statistical machine learning, Deep learning, Transformers and scale | 1.1×10²³ FLOP (AlphaStar, 2019) | ×7.4×10⁴ | First ImageNet challenge (ILSVRC); IBM Watson wins Jeopardy!; Siri ships on iPhone 4S; AlexNet wins ImageNet (+10 more) | DERIVED |
| 2020s | Transformers and scale, Generative AI goes mainstream, Reasoning models and agents | 9.4×10²⁶ FLOP (GPT-6 Astra, 2026) | ×8,725 | GPT-3; AlphaFold 2 at CASP14; PaLM; Stable Diffusion released with open weights (+33 more) | DERIVED |
Generated from the AI Development Index dataset (Report AI calculation). Model counts refer to models in our compute series, not all models built.
Training compute: from 10⁶ FLOP for the Perceptron to about 10²⁷ for today’s frontier
Training compute is the number of arithmetic operations used to train a model. It is the measure most closely linked to capability gains in the deep-learning era and the one with the longest consistent record. All values are Epoch AI estimates; labs rarely disclose them, and Epoch rates each estimate’s confidence.
Growth rates: Epoch estimates a doubling roughly every 20 months before 2010 and about every 6 months afterwards (about 4–5× a year), and about 5× a year for frontier language models since 2020 (90% interval 4–6×).
Landmark models: estimated training compute
Growth rates
| Date | Measure | Value | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| pre-2010 | Growth rate: pre-2010 (doubling time) | 20 months per doubling | Sevilla et al. 2022, Compute Trends Across Three Eras | MEDIUM |
| 2012–2018 | Growth rate: OpenAI 2012–2018 (doubling time) | 3.4 months per doubling | OpenAI, AI and Compute (May 2018) | MEDIUM |
| 2010–2022 | Growth rate: deep-learning era (doubling time) | 6 months per doubling | Sevilla et al. 2022 | MEDIUM |
| 2010–May 2024 | Growth rate: notable models 2010–May 2024 | 4.1 × per year | Epoch AI | MEDIUM |
| 2010–2024 | Doubling time implied by 4.1×/yr | 5.9 months per doubling | Report AI calculation | DERIVED |
| 2020–Feb 2026 | Growth rate: frontier language models since 2020 | 5 × per year | Epoch AI, Trends in AI (page ‘Updated Feb. 5, 2026’), opened 12 Nov 2026 | HIGH |
Disclosed parameter counts
GPT-4’s parameter count has never been disclosed; the widely quoted 1.76–1.8 trillion is a rumour.
Capability: benchmarks rise from near zero to saturation in one to five years
Benchmark scores are the most quoted and least stable measure of AI progress. Each test measures something narrow, results depend on settings, and most scores are reported by the developer. The table lists the dated results in our dataset; the companion report charts four of them and estimates how long each test lasted.
Benchmark results over time
| Date | Measure | Value | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | ImageNet top-5 error — 2010 winner (NEC-UIUC) | 28.2 % error | ILSVRC results (via search summaries) | MEDIUM |
| 2011 | ImageNet top-5 error — 2011 winner (XRCE) | 25.8 % error | ILSVRC results (via search summaries) | MEDIUM |
| Sep 2012 | ImageNet top-5 error — 2012 AlexNet | 15.3 % error | Krizhevsky et al. 2012; ILSVRC 2012 | MEDIUM |
| 2013 | ImageNet top-5 error — 2013 winner (Clarifai) | 11.2 % error | ILSVRC results (via search summaries) | MEDIUM |
| 2014 | ImageNet top-5 error — 2014 GoogLeNet | 6.67 % error | ILSVRC results (via search summaries) | MEDIUM |
| 2 Sep 2014 | ImageNet human baseline (one annotator) | 5.1 % error | Karpathy blog | MEDIUM |
| Dec 2015 | ImageNet top-5 error — 2015 ResNet | 3.57 % error | He et al. 2015 | MEDIUM |
| 2016 | ImageNet top-5 error — 2016 winner (Trimps-Soushen) | 2.99 % error | ILSVRC results (via search summaries) | MEDIUM |
| 2017 | ImageNet top-5 error — 2017 SENet | 2.25 % error | Hu et al. (SENet) | MEDIUM |
| 2010–2017 | ImageNet: error cut 2010→2017 | 12.5 × reduction | Report AI calculation | DERIVED |
| 2020 | ARC-AGI-1 — 2020 Kaggle top | 20 % tasks | ARC Prize 2024 technical report | MEDIUM |
| 2020 | MMLU — GPT-3 175B (few-shot) | 43.9 % correct | Hendrycks et al. MMLU leaderboard | MEDIUM |
| Dec 2021 | MMLU — Gopher 280B | 60 % correct | MMLU leaderboard | MEDIUM |
| Mar 2022 | MMLU — Chinchilla 70B | 67.5 % correct | MMLU leaderboard | MEDIUM |
| 2023 | SWE-bench (original) — best 2023 | 4.4 % resolved | Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 | MEDIUM |
| Mar 2023 | MMLU — GPT-4 | 86.4 % correct | OpenAI GPT-4 technical report (via aggregator) | MEDIUM |
| Nov 2023 | GPQA — GPT-4 baseline (main set) | 39 % correct | Rein et al. 2023 | MEDIUM |
| 2024 | ARC-AGI-1 — GPT-4o | 5 % tasks (semi-private) | ARC Prize public leaderboard | MEDIUM |
| Jun 2024 | GPQA Diamond — Claude 3.5 Sonnet | 59.4 % correct | GPQA leaderboard snapshot (via search) | MEDIUM |
| mid-2024 | ARC-AGI-1 — top score mid-2024 | 33 % tasks | ARC Prize 2024 technical report | MEDIUM |
| Jul 2024 | IMO — AlphaProof + AlphaGeometry 2 | 28 points of 42 | Google DeepMind | MEDIUM |
| Sep 2024 | MMLU — o1 | 92.3 % correct | OpenAI (o1 announcement) | MEDIUM |
| Oct 2024 | SWE-bench Verified — Claude 3.5 Sonnet (best GA) | 49 % resolved | Anthropic, as cited on Report AI | MEDIUM |
| Nov 2024 | ARC-AGI-1 — MindsAI (ARC Prize 2024) | 55.5 % tasks (private) | ARC Prize 2024 technical report | MEDIUM |
| Nov 2024 | FrontierMath — best model at launch | 2 % solved | Epoch AI launch, as reported | MEDIUM |
| Dec 2024 | GPQA Diamond — o3 (preview) | 87.7 % correct | OpenAI | MEDIUM |
| Dec 2024 | SWE-bench Verified — o3 preview | 71.7 % resolved | OpenAI via Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 | MEDIUM |
| 20 Dec 2024 | ARC-AGI-1 — o3 preview ($10k limit) | 75.7 % tasks (semi-private) | ARC Prize Foundation | MEDIUM |
| 20 Dec 2024 | FrontierMath — o3 (OpenAI-reported) | 25.2 % solved | OpenAI, as reported | MEDIUM |
| Jan 2025 | Humanity’s Last Exam — launch (o1 / R1) | 9 % correct | CAIS / Scale AI | MEDIUM |
| Apr 2025 | FrontierMath — Epoch independent run of o3 | 10 % solved | Epoch AI via TechCrunch | MEDIUM |
| Jul 2025 | IMO — Gemini Deep Think (certified gold) | 35 points of 42 | Google DeepMind / IMO | MEDIUM |
| 24 Nov 2025 | SWE-bench Verified — Claude Opus 4.5 | 80.9 % resolved | Anthropic (vendor) | MEDIUM |
| Dec 2025 | GPQA Diamond — Gemini 3 Deep Think | 93.8 % correct | Google (vendor) | MEDIUM |
| Dec 2025 | Humanity’s Last Exam — Gemini 3 Deep Think (no tools) | 41 % correct | R&D World tabulation | MEDIUM |
| 5 Dec 2025 | ARC-AGI-2 — Poetiq on Gemini 3 Pro | 54 % tasks | ARC Prize verification via BD Tech Talks | MEDIUM |
| Feb 2026 | GPQA Diamond — Gemini 3.1 Pro | 94.3 % correct | Google DeepMind model card | MEDIUM |
| Feb 2026 | ARC-AGI-2 — Gemini 3 Deep Think | 84.6 % tasks | ARC Prize verification via OfficeChai | MEDIUM |
| 2026 | FrontierMath tiers 1–3 — Claude Fable 5 (Epoch) | 87 % solved | Epoch AI, as reported by The Decoder | MEDIUM |
| Jul 2026 | IMO — multiple systems (perfect) | 42 points of 42 | Trade press | MEDIUM |
| 1 Sep 2026 | SWE-bench Verified — Claude Opus 5 (Vals.ai) | 97 % resolved | Vals.ai leaderboard | MEDIUM |
| 17 Oct 2026 | Humanity’s Last Exam — GPT-6 Astra | 54.8 % correct | Scale Labs leaderboard via BenchLM mirror | MEDIUM |
Vendor-reported unless the source says otherwise. SWE-bench (2023) and SWE-bench Verified (2024 onward) are different tests.
Cost: buying a fixed capability gets cheaper every year, while building the frontier gets dearer
Two cost measures run in opposite directions. The price of using a model at a fixed level of capability has fallen by one to two orders of magnitude every few years; the cost of training the newest frontier model has risen by about 2.4–3.5× a year, according to Epoch AI.
View the data
| Date | Item | US$ per M tokens |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2023 | (GPT-4 launch) | 37.5 |
| Nov 2023 | (GPT-4 Turbo) | 15 |
| Dec 2024 | (DeepSeek-V3) | 0.477 |
| Sep 2025 | (DeepSeek-V3.2-Exp) | 0.315 |
| Oct 2026 | (GPT-6 Luna / Haiku 5.5) | 0.2 |
Notes: Blended at 3:1 input:output (Report AI method).REPORTAI report-ai.org
Inference prices
| Date | Measure | Value | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov 2022 | GPT-3.5-level (MMLU 64.8) cheapest price | $20 per million tokens | Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 | MEDIUM |
| Mar 2023 | GPT-4-level cheapest blended price (GPT-4 launch) | $37.5 per million tokens (3:1 blend) | OpenAI list price $30/$60; Report AI blend | DERIVED |
| Nov 2023 | GPT-4-level cheapest blended price (GPT-4 Turbo) | $15 per million tokens (3:1 blend) | OpenAI DevDay pricing; Report AI blend | DERIVED |
| Nov 2022–Oct 2024 | GPT-3.5-level decline Nov 2022→Oct 2024 | 286 × cheaper | Report AI calculation | DERIVED |
| Oct 2024 | GPT-3.5-level (MMLU 64.8) cheapest price | $0.07 per million tokens | Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 | MEDIUM |
| Nov 2021–Nov 2024 | Price decline at fixed capability (a16z) | 10 × per year | a16z, LLMflation | MEDIUM |
| Dec 2024 | GPT-4-level cheapest blended price (DeepSeek-V3) | $0.477 per million tokens (3:1 blend) | DeepSeek API; Report AI blend | DERIVED |
| to Mar 2025 | Price decline at fixed capability (Epoch median) | 50 × per year | Epoch AI, LLM inference price trends | MEDIUM |
| Sep 2025 | GPT-4-level cheapest blended price (DeepSeek-V3.2-Exp) | $0.315 per million tokens (3:1 blend) | DeepSeek API; Report AI blend | DERIVED |
| Mar 2023–Oct 2026 | GPT-4-level decline Mar 2023→Oct 2026 | 188 × cheaper | Report AI calculation | DERIVED |
| three years to 2026 | Price decline at fixed capability (Epoch 2026) | 12.7 × per year | Epoch AI, The plunging price of thought | DERIVED |
| 1 Sep 2026 | Usage-weighted market price (Silicon Data index) | $0.97 per million tokens | Silicon Data via CNBC | MEDIUM |
| Oct 2026 | GPT-4-level cheapest blended price (GPT-6 Luna / Haiku 5.5) | $0.2 per million tokens (3:1 blend) | Vendor prices as reported; Report AI blend | DERIVED |
Training costs
Amortised (hardware depreciation plus energy, 2023 dollars) and cloud-rental estimates are different methods and are labelled separately.
Capital: corporate AI investment rose about 29-fold in real terms from 2013 to 2025
Investment figures come from the Stanford HAI AI Index (Quid data), republished by Our World in Data in constant 2021 dollars. Each AI Index edition restates earlier years, so current-dollar figures from different editions should not be joined into one series; the constant-dollar series below is consistent.
View the data
| Global private AI investment | |
|---|---|
| 2013 | 6.01 |
| 2014 | 10.9 |
| 2015 | 15.3 |
| 2016 | 19.3 |
| 2017 | 28.4 |
| 2018 | 46.5 |
| 2019 | 61.7 |
| 2020 | 77.3 |
| 2021 | 145 |
| 2022 | 105 |
| 2023 | 92.8 |
| 2024 | 131 |
| 2025 | 290 |
Notes: Private investment only. The AI Index’s current-dollar figure for 2025 is $344.7B.REPORTAI report-ai.org
Corporate, generative-AI and venture investment
| Date | Measure | Value | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | Global corporate AI investment — Total (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 16,947,474,940 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2014 | Global corporate AI investment — Total (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 21,793,344,195 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2015 | Global corporate AI investment — Total (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 29,072,882,368 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2016 | Global corporate AI investment — Total (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 38,183,074,315 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2017 | Global corporate AI investment — Total (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 59,385,234,310 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2018 | Global corporate AI investment (AI Index 2023 ed.) | $79.6B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2023 | MEDIUM |
| 2018 | Global corporate AI investment — Total (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 85,918,080,126 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2019 | Generative-AI private investment | $840.0M | AI Index 2024 via Forklog | MEDIUM |
| 2019 | Global corporate AI investment — Total (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 109,455,530,391 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2020 | Global private AI investment (AI Index 2022 ed.) | $46.0B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2022 via IEEE Spectrum | MEDIUM |
| 2020 | Global corporate AI investment — Total (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 232,293,505,123 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2021 | Global corporate AI investment (AI Index 2023 ed.) | $276.1B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2023 | MEDIUM |
| 2021 | Global private AI investment (AI Index 2022 ed.) | $93.5B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2022 | MEDIUM |
| 2021 | Global private AI investment (AI Index 2023 ed.) | $125.4B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2023 | MEDIUM |
| 2021 | Global corporate AI investment — Total (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 360,729,994,297 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2022 | Global corporate AI investment (AI Index 2023 ed.) | $189.6B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2023 via IEEE Spectrum | MEDIUM |
| 2022 | Global private AI investment (AI Index 2023 ed.) | $91.9B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2023 | MEDIUM |
| 2022 | Generative-AI private investment | $3.0B | Stanford HAI (AI Index 2024 summary) | MEDIUM |
| 2022 | Global corporate AI investment — Total (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 234,484,815,268 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2023 | Generative-AI private investment | $25.2B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2024 | MEDIUM |
| 2023 | Global corporate AI investment — Total (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 178,748,319,573 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2024 | Global corporate AI investment (AI Index 2025 ed.) | $252.3B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 | MEDIUM |
| 2024 | Global private AI investment (AI Index 2026 ed., implied 2024 base) | $151.5B | Report AI calculation from AI Index 2026 (+127.5% to $344.66B) | DERIVED |
| 2024 | Generative-AI private investment | $33.9B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 | MEDIUM |
| 2024 | Global AI venture funding (Crunchbase) | $100.0B | Crunchbase News | MEDIUM |
| 2024 | Global corporate AI investment — Total (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 218,563,067,882 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2025 | Global corporate AI investment (AI Index 2026 ed.) | $581.7B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2026 | MEDIUM |
| 2025 | Global private AI investment (AI Index 2026 ed.) | $344.7B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2026 | MEDIUM |
| 2025 | Generative-AI private investment | $170.9B | AI Index 2026 via single secondary summary | MEDIUM |
| 2025 | Global AI venture funding (Crunchbase) | $202.3B | Crunchbase News | MEDIUM |
| 2025 | Global corporate AI investment — Total (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 489,591,464,709 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| Jan–Sep 2026 | Global AI venture funding (Crunchbase), Jan–Sep | $488.0B | Crunchbase quarterly reports; Report AI sum | DERIVED |
Private AI investment, United States and China
| Date | Measure | Value | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | US private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 4,211,478,899 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2013 | China private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 717,196,154 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2014 | US private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 7,963,123,765 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2014 | China private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 771,392,259 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2015 | US private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 10,632,666,176 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2015 | China private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 2,385,249,652 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2016 | US private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 11,464,266,076 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2016 | China private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 5,102,962,753 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2017 | US private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 15,548,779,419 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2017 | China private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 7,314,146,387 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2018 | US private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 22,716,604,134 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2018 | China private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 15,069,709,833 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2019 | US private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 33,994,613,790 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2019 | China private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 14,895,814,015 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2020 | US private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 46,294,131,458 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2020 | China private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 17,871,570,528 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2021 | US private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 86,855,560,303 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2021 | China private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 25,891,134,262 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2022 | US private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 56,651,417,674 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2022 | China private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 13,951,917,588 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2023 | US private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 64,353,629,904 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2023 | China private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 8,419,883,132 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2024 | US private AI investment | $109.1B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 | MEDIUM |
| 2024 | US private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 94,629,349,595 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2024 | China private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 8,109,463,468 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2025 | US private AI investment | $285.9B | Stanford HAI AI Index 2026 | MEDIUM |
| 2025 | US private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 240,612,883,142 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
| 2025 | China private AI investment (OWID, constant 2021 US$) | 10,446,895,788 USD (constant 2021) | Our World in Data, from Quid via Stanford HAI AI Index Report (2026); constant 2021 US$ (C | HIGH |
Adoption: from a specialist tool to a billion weekly users
Adoption is measured two ways here: by organisations (McKinsey’s annual survey) and by people (ChatGPT weekly active users disclosed by OpenAI). Neither measures depth of use or financial impact. Research output is shown through notable-model counts by affiliation and country, and AI publications and patents.
Organisational and consumer adoption
| Date | Measure | Value | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | Organisations using AI in ≥1 function (McKinsey) | 20 % of respondents | McKinsey Global Survey on AI (via AI Index 2024 / McKinsey 2024 chart) | MEDIUM |
| 2018 | Organisations using AI in ≥1 function (McKinsey) | 47 % of respondents | McKinsey Global Survey on AI (via McKinsey 2024 chart) | MEDIUM |
| 2019 | Organisations using AI in ≥1 function (McKinsey) | 58 % of respondents | McKinsey Global Survey on AI (via McKinsey 2024 chart) | MEDIUM |
| 2020 | Organisations using AI in ≥1 function (McKinsey) | 50 % of respondents | McKinsey Global Survey on AI, The state of AI in 2020 | MEDIUM |
| 2021 | Organisations using AI in ≥1 function (McKinsey) | 56 % of respondents | McKinsey Global Survey on AI, The state of AI in 2021 | MEDIUM |
| 2022 | Organisations using AI in ≥1 function (McKinsey) | 50 % of respondents | McKinsey Global Survey on AI (via Stanford AI Index 2024) | MEDIUM |
| 2023 | Organisations using AI in ≥1 function (McKinsey) | 55 % of respondents | McKinsey Global Survey on AI (via Stanford AI Index 2024) | MEDIUM |
| Jan 2023 | ChatGPT monthly users (UBS estimate) | 100M users (monthly) | UBS analyst note using Similarweb data, via Reuters | MEDIUM |
| 6 Nov 2023 | ChatGPT weekly active users | 100M users (weekly) | OpenAI DevDay | MEDIUM |
| Feb–Mar 2024 survey | Organisations using AI in ≥1 function (McKinsey) | 72 % of respondents | McKinsey Global Survey on AI, early 2024 | MEDIUM |
| Jul 2024 survey | Organisations using AI in ≥1 function (McKinsey) | 78 % of respondents | McKinsey Global Survey on AI | MEDIUM |
| Aug 2024 | ChatGPT weekly active users | 200M users (weekly) | OpenAI via Axios | MEDIUM |
| Dec 2024 | ChatGPT weekly active users | 300M users (weekly) | OpenAI | MEDIUM |
| Feb 2025 | ChatGPT weekly active users | 400M users (weekly) | OpenAI via Reuters/TechCrunch | MEDIUM |
| end Mar 2025 | ChatGPT weekly active users | 500M users (weekly) | Business Insider via AOL | MEDIUM |
| Jun–Jul 2025 survey | Organisations using AI in ≥1 function (McKinsey) | 88 % of respondents | McKinsey Global Survey on AI, State of AI 2025 | MEDIUM |
| Jul 2025 | ChatGPT weekly active users | 700M users (weekly) | OpenAI | MEDIUM |
| 6 Oct 2025 | ChatGPT weekly active users | 800M users (weekly) | OpenAI DevDay via TechCrunch | MEDIUM |
| Nov 2023–Aug 2026 | ChatGPT weekly users: 100M → 1B | 2.83 years | Report AI calculation | DERIVED |
| 27 Feb 2026 | ChatGPT weekly active users | 900M users (weekly) | OpenAI via TechCrunch | MEDIUM |
| May–Jun 2026 survey | Organisations using AI in ≥1 function (McKinsey) | 89 % of respondents | McKinsey Global Survey on AI, State of AI 2026 | MEDIUM |
| 31 Aug 2026 | ChatGPT weekly active users | 1,000M users (weekly) | OpenAI | MEDIUM |
Notable AI models per year, all and by country
Notable AI systems by affiliation (industry, academia, both)
| Date | Measure | Value | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 4 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2003 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2003 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2003 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2004 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 1 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2004 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2004 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2004 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2005 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 1 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2005 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2005 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 1 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2005 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2006 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 8 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2006 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 1 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2006 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2006 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2007 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 3 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2007 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2007 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 3 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2007 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2008 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 4 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2008 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2008 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 2 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2008 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2009 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 5 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2009 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2009 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 6 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2009 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2010 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 8 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2010 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 1 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2010 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 1 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2010 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2011 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 8 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2011 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 3 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2011 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2011 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2012 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 8 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2012 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 2 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2012 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 3 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2012 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2013 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 10 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2013 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 2 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2013 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 7 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2013 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 0 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2014 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 21 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2014 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 6 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2014 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 5 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2014 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 1 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2015 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 9 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2015 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 5 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2015 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 13 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2015 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 1 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2016 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 18 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2016 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 8 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2016 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 21 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2016 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 2 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2017 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 18 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2017 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 10 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2017 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 26 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2017 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 1 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2018 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 4 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2018 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 8 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2018 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 23 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2018 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 2 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2019 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 12 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2019 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 21 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2019 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 30 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2019 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 5 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2020 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 9 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2020 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 12 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2020 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 25 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2020 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 4 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2021 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 9 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2021 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 20 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2021 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 46 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2021 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 4 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2022 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 17 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2022 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 19 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2022 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 50 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2022 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 5 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2023 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 18 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2023 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 29 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2023 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 69 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2023 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 3 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2024 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 3 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2024 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 12 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2024 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 81 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2024 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 2 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2025 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia (OWID/Epoch) | 2 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2025 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Academia and industry collaboration (OWID/Epoch) | 5 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2025 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Industry (OWID/Epoch) | 97 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
| 2025 | Notable AI systems by affiliation — Other (OWID/Epoch) | 1 systems per year | Our World in Data, from Epoch AI (2026); 2026 data incomplete (Epoch update 4 Sep 2026) | HIGH |
AI publications and patents
| Date | Measure | Value | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | AI patents (AI Index 2025 series) | 3,833 patents | Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 | MEDIUM |
| 2013 | AI publications (all venues) | 102,000 publications | Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 | MEDIUM |
| 2022 | AI patents granted (AI Index 2024 series) | 62,264 patents | Stanford HAI AI Index 2024 | MEDIUM |
| 2023 | AI publications (all venues) | 242,000 publications | Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 | MEDIUM |
| 2023 | AI patents (AI Index 2025 series) | 122,511 patents | Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 | MEDIUM |
| 2013–2023 | AI publications growth 2013→2023 | 2.37 × (multiple) | Report AI calculation | DERIVED |
Risk and resources: incidents and electricity use are rising, but are the least complete series
Reported incidents measure what is reported to the AI Incident Database, which grows with attention as well as harm. Electricity figures for data centres cover all workloads, not only AI; AI-optimised servers are estimated separately where a source provides it.
Reported AI incidents
| Date | Measure | Value | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | AI incidents reported (AI Incident Database) | 10 incidents (upper bound) | Stanford HAI AI Index 2026 (AIID data) | MEDIUM |
| 2023 | AI incidents reported (AI Incident Database) | 149 incidents | Report AI calculation from AI Index 2025 (+56.4% to 233) | DERIVED |
| 2024 | AI incidents reported (AI Incident Database) | 233 incidents | Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 | MEDIUM |
| 2025 | AI incidents reported (AI Incident Database) | 362 incidents | Stanford HAI AI Index 2026 | MEDIUM |
| Aug–Oct 2026 | New AIID entries, Aug–Oct | 179 entries | Report AI count of AIID IDs | DERIVED |
Data-centre electricity
| Date | Measure | Value | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | US data-centre electricity (LBNL) | 176 TWh | LBNL (Dec 2024), as cited on Report AI | MEDIUM |
| 2024 | Global data-centre electricity (IEA) | 415 TWh | IEA, Energy and AI (Apr 2025) | MEDIUM |
| 2025 | Global data-centre electricity (IEA) | 485 TWh | IEA, Key Questions on Energy and AI (Apr 2026) | MEDIUM |
| 2025 | Global data-centre electricity (Gartner) | 447 TWh | Gartner (10 Jun 2026) | MEDIUM |
| 2025 | AI-optimised server electricity (Gartner) | 95 TWh | Gartner via Network World | MEDIUM |
| 2026 forecast | Global data-centre electricity (Gartner forecast) | 565 TWh | Gartner (10 Jun 2026) | MEDIUM |
| projection to 2030 | Global data-centre electricity (IEA projection) | 945 TWh | IEA, Energy and AI (Apr 2025) | MEDIUM |
| 2024–2030 | IEA 2024→2030 growth | 0.147 CAGR (fraction) | Report AI calculation | DERIVED |
| projection to 2035 | Global data-centre electricity (IEA Base Case) | 1,200 TWh | IEA, Energy and AI | MEDIUM |
The milestone register: 70 dated events from 1943 to 2026
Every milestone below carries its date, what it showed, a source and a confidence rating. Events from 2022 onward are covered in more detail in the State of AI timeline and annual editions.
All milestones
| Date | Milestone | What it showed | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1943 | McCulloch–Pitts neuron | First mathematical model of a network of simplified neurons computing logical functions. | McCulloch & Pitts, Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 5 | MEDIUM |
| 1950-10 | Turing’s ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ | Replaces ‘Can machines think?’ with the imitation game (Turing test). Turing predicted that in about 50 years machines with ~10^9 storage would leave an average interrogator no more than a 70% chance of a correct identification after five minutes. | Turing, Mind 59(236) | MEDIUM |
| 1955-08-31 | Dartmouth proposal coins ‘artificial intelligence’ | McCarthy, Minsky, Rochester and Shannon propose a summer study; the document introduces the term. Proposed as a ‘2 month, 10 man study’. | AI Magazine reprint of the proposal | MEDIUM |
| 1956-06-18 | Dartmouth Summer Research Project | Conventional founding event of AI as a field. Ran roughly 18 Jun–17 Aug 1956 (about eight weeks) per Solomonoff’s notes; other accounts say six weeks. | Wikipedia, Dartmouth workshop (citing Solomonoff) | MEDIUM |
| 1958-07 | Rosenblatt’s perceptron unveiled | First learning machine to attract mass publicity; the US Navy’s ONR demonstrated it in July 1958 (a simulation on an IBM 704). Mark I Perceptron used a 400-sensor ‘retina’ and ~1,000 weights; Epoch estimates its training compute at ~6.95×10^5 FLOP. | Rosenblatt, Psychological Review 65(6) 1958; Wikipedia Mark I Perceptron | MEDIUM |
| 1966 | Shakey the robot (SRI) | First mobile robot to reason about its own actions; its STRIPS planner became the basis for later automated planners. | Holloway, Making Things Think | MEDIUM |
| 1966-01 | ELIZA | Weizenbaum’s pattern-matching ‘therapist’ program; first widely known chatbot and first demonstration of people over-attributing understanding to software. | Weizenbaum, Communications of the ACM 9(1), 1966 | MEDIUM |
| 1969 | Mansfield Amendment and ‘Perceptrons’ | US law pushes DARPA toward mission-oriented research; Minsky & Papert’s book highlights single-layer perceptron limits. | Wikipedia, AI winter | MEDIUM |
| 1973 | Lighthill report | UK Science Research Council review concludes AI had failed its grand promises; UK funding is sharply curtailed. Debated on BBC TV in June 1973. | Holloway / Wikipedia AI winter | MEDIUM |
| 1974 | DARPA cuts AI funding | Marks the start of the first AI winter in the US. DARPA cancelled ~$3M a year of Speech Understanding Research grants at Carnegie Mellon. | Wikipedia, AI winter | MEDIUM |
| 1980 | R1/XCON at Digital Equipment Corporation | First commercially significant expert system; starts the expert-systems boom. Most sources put savings at ~$25M a year; by 1986 it had processed 80,000 orders at 95–98% accuracy. | McDermott (AAAI 1980); secondary histories | MEDIUM |
| 1982 | Japan’s Fifth Generation project (ICOT) | Ten-year MITI programme for logic-programming computers; spurred Western counter-programmes. Initial budget ~¥54 billion over ten years; total spending a little under ¥57 billion (~$320M) by the end. | Wikipedia, Fifth Generation Computer Systems | MEDIUM |
| 1986-10-09 | Backpropagation popularised | Rumelhart, Hinton & Williams show multi-layer networks learn useful internal representations. Nature 323:533–536. | Nature | MEDIUM |
| 1987 | Lisp-machine market collapses; NETtalk | End of dedicated AI hardware boom marks the second AI winter; same year NETtalk shows a neural net learning to pronounce text. NETtalk training compute ~2.8×10^10 FLOP (Epoch). | Holloway; Epoch AI via search | MEDIUM |
| 1997-05-11 | Deep Blue beats Kasparov | First defeat of a reigning world chess champion by a computer in a match under tournament conditions. Won the rematch 3½–2½ (two wins, one loss, three draws); evaluated ~200 million positions per second. Kasparov had won the 1996 match 4–2. | IBM / History.com, via search | MEDIUM |
| 1997-11 | LSTM | Hochreiter & Schmidhuber’s long short-term memory, the recurrent architecture behind most sequence models until the Transformer. | Neural Computation 9(8) | MEDIUM |
| 1998-11 | LeNet-5 | LeCun et al.’s convolutional network for handwriting recognition, deployed for cheque reading. Training compute ~2.8×10^12 FLOP (Epoch, ‘Confident’). | Epoch AI via search summary | MEDIUM |
| 2005-10 | DARPA Grand Challenge won | Stanford’s Stanley completes a 132-mile desert course autonomously, a year after no vehicle finished. 6 h 53 min 58 s; in 2004 the best vehicle managed ~7.4 miles. | DARPA / Stanford Racing Team | MEDIUM |
| 2006-07 | Deep belief nets | Hinton, Osindero & Teh show deep networks can be trained layer by layer, reviving neural-network research. | Neural Computation 18(7):1527–1554 | MEDIUM |
| 2010 | First ImageNet challenge (ILSVRC) | Establishes the benchmark that later showcased deep learning. Winning top-5 error 28.2% (NEC-UIUC). | ILSVRC results via search | MEDIUM |
| 2011-02-16 | IBM Watson wins Jeopardy! | Open-domain question answering beats the show’s two best champions on TV. Two-game totals: Watson $77,147; Ken Jennings $24,000; Brad Rutter $21,600. | IBM | MEDIUM |
| 2011-10 | Siri ships on iPhone 4S | First voice assistant in mainstream consumer use. | Search summary | MEDIUM |
| 2012-09-30 | AlexNet wins ImageNet | GPU-trained deep convolutional net wins by a wide margin, triggering the deep-learning era. Top-5 error 15.3% vs 26.2% for the second-best entry; ~60M parameters; trained on two GTX 580 GPUs; ~4.7×10^17 FLOP (Epoch). | Krizhevsky, Sutskever & Hinton, NIPS 2012; Epoch AI | MEDIUM |
| 2014-01-26 | Google acquires DeepMind | Big Tech begins buying frontier AI labs. Price undisclosed; reported at $400M (Re/code) to more than $500M (The Information). | TechCrunch | MEDIUM |
| 2014-06-10 | Generative adversarial networks | Goodfellow et al. introduce GANs, the main image-generation method until diffusion models. | arXiv 1406.2661 | MEDIUM |
| 2014-09 | Sequence-to-sequence learning | Sutskever, Vinyals & Le show end-to-end neural machine translation with LSTMs. Training compute ~5.6×10^19 FLOP (Epoch). | Epoch AI via search | MEDIUM |
| 2015-12 | ResNet beats human-level ImageNet error | Residual networks win ILSVRC 2015. Top-5 error 3.57%, below the 5.1% single-annotator human estimate. | He et al., arXiv 1512.03385 | MEDIUM |
| 2016-03-15 | AlphaGo defeats Lee Sedol | First defeat of a 9-dan Go professional without handicap, a decade earlier than many expected. 4–1 in Seoul, 9–15 Mar 2016; AlphaGo had beaten Fan Hui 5–0 in Oct 2015 (Nature, 27 Jan 2016). | Nature / press | MEDIUM |
| 2017-06-12 | The Transformer | ‘Attention Is All You Need’ introduces the architecture behind every frontier language model since. 28.4 BLEU on WMT14 English–German; ~7.4×10^18 FLOP training compute (Epoch). | arXiv 1706.03762 | MEDIUM |
| 2017-10 | AlphaGo Zero | Learns Go from self-play alone, without human games; among the first models trained on >10^23 FLOP. ~6.5×10^20 FLOP of direct training compute (Epoch, ‘Confident’); OpenAI’s 2018 figure of ~3.4×10^23 included self-play data generation. | Epoch AI Notable AI Models CSV | MEDIUM |
| 2018-05 | OpenAI ‘AI and Compute’ | First widely cited measurement of exploding training compute. More than 300,000× growth from AlexNet to AlphaGo Zero; 3.4-month doubling time (2012–2018). | OpenAI | MEDIUM |
| 2018-10 | BERT | Pre-trained bidirectional Transformer resets most language-understanding benchmarks. BERT-Large ~340M parameters; ~2.8×10^20 FLOP (Epoch). | Google; Epoch AI | MEDIUM |
| 2019-02-14 | GPT-2 and staged release | OpenAI withholds the full model at first over misuse concerns, starting the release-norms debate. 1.5B parameters; ~1.9×10^21 FLOP (Epoch). | OpenAI; Epoch AI | MEDIUM |
| 2020-05-28 | GPT-3 | Shows few-shot learning emerges from scale. 175B parameters; 3.14×10^23 FLOP; 43.9% on MMLU (few-shot); ~$4.3M estimated training cost (AI Index 2024). | Brown et al., arXiv 2005.14165 | MEDIUM |
| 2020-11-30 | AlphaFold 2 at CASP14 | Effectively solves single-chain protein structure prediction, a 50-year-old problem. Median 92.4 GDT across all targets (≈90 is considered competitive with experiment). | Google DeepMind | MEDIUM |
| 2022-04 | PaLM | Largest dense model of its time; strong reasoning results. 540B parameters; ~2.5×10^24 FLOP (Epoch). | Google; Epoch AI | MEDIUM |
| 2022-08-22 | Stable Diffusion released with open weights | High-quality image generation runs on consumer hardware. | Stability AI via secondary timelines | MEDIUM |
| 2022-11-30 | ChatGPT launches | Generative AI becomes a mass consumer product. 1M users in five days (OpenAI); UBS estimated 100M monthly users by January 2023 from Similarweb data. | OpenAI; UBS via Reuters | MEDIUM |
| 2023-02-24 | Meta releases LLaMA | Capable model weights spread beyond big labs (leaked publicly in early March), seeding the open-weight ecosystem. 7B–65B parameters. | Meta; secondary timelines | MEDIUM |
| 2023-03-14 | GPT-4 | Frontier model with strong exam performance; sets the ‘GPT-4 class’ bar. 86.4% MMLU; ~2.1×10^25 FLOP and ~$78M training compute cost (Epoch/AI Index); OpenAI’s ‘top 10% of bar takers’ claim was later disputed. | OpenAI technical report | MEDIUM |
| 2023-03-22 | FLI ‘pause’ letter | Open letter calls for a six-month pause on training systems more powerful than GPT-4. | Future of Life Institute | MEDIUM |
| 2023-11-01 | Bletchley Park AI Safety Summit | First intergovernmental summit on frontier-AI risk; Bletchley Declaration. | UK Government | MEDIUM |
| 2023-11-06 | ChatGPT reaches 100M weekly users | OpenAI’s first own disclosure of the 100M mark (weekly users). 100M weekly active users at OpenAI’s first DevDay. | OpenAI DevDay via TechCrunch | MEDIUM |
| 2023-12 | Gemini 1.0 Ultra | Google’s first frontier multimodal model; most expensive training run estimated at the time. ~5.0×10^25 FLOP (Epoch, ‘Speculative’); ~$191M cloud-basis cost in AI Index 2024 (Epoch’s current CSV: $206M cloud, $30.7M amortised in 2023 USD). | Epoch AI; Stanford AI Index 2024 | MEDIUM |
| 2024-07 | Llama 3.1 405B | Open-weight model at near-frontier scale. ~3.8×10^25 FLOP (6 × 405B params × 15.6T tokens); ~$170M estimated cost (AI Index 2025). | Epoch AI; Stanford AI Index 2025 | MEDIUM |
| 2024-08-01 | EU AI Act enters into force | First comprehensive AI statute in a major economy; obligations phase in from Feb 2025. Maximum fines €35M or 7% of worldwide turnover. | European Commission | MEDIUM |
| 2024-09-12 | OpenAI o1-preview: reasoning models | Models trained to ‘think’ before answering; inference-time compute becomes a scaling axis. OpenAI reported o1 solved 83% of AIME (the US IMO qualifier) problems with 64-sample consensus vs 13% for GPT-4o; o1-preview ~57%. | OpenAI | MEDIUM |
| 2024-10-08 | Nobel Prizes for AI research | Physics to Hopfield and Hinton (8 Oct); half of Chemistry to Hassabis and Jumper for AlphaFold (9 Oct). | Nobel announcements via press | MEDIUM |
| 2024-10-22 | Computer use (Anthropic) | First frontier model offered with the ability to operate a desktop GUI; start of the agent era. | Anthropic | MEDIUM |
| 2024-12-20 | o3 announced | Large jumps on hard reasoning benchmarks. ARC-AGI-1 75.7% within the $10k limit (87.5% high-compute); FrontierMath 25.2% (OpenAI-run; Epoch’s own later run ~10%); SWE-bench Verified 71.7%. | ARC Prize; OpenAI via press | MEDIUM |
| 2025-01 | Stargate announced | Private US AI-infrastructure commitment marks the gigawatt-scale data-centre era. $500B over four years, $100B immediately. | OpenAI | MEDIUM |
| 2025-01-20 | DeepSeek-R1 | Chinese open-weight reasoning model near the frontier at far lower prices. Nvidia lost ~$589B of market value on 27 Jan 2025 (Bloomberg; Reuters says ~$593B), a record one-day loss. | Bloomberg; DeepSeek | MEDIUM |
| 2025-02 | Grok 3: first model above 10^26 FLOP | Epoch’s first estimate of a training run above 10^26 FLOP. ~3.5×10^26 FLOP (Epoch CSV, ‘Likely’; ~80,000 H100s for ~3 months). | Epoch AI | HIGH |
| 2025-07 | AI wins IMO gold (certified) | Natural-language maths at olympiad gold level within contest time. 35/42 (5 of 6 problems), Gemini Deep Think, certified by the IMO. | Google DeepMind | MEDIUM |
| 2025-07 | Grok 4: largest known 2025 training run | Largest estimated run of 2025. ~5×10^26 FLOP and ~$490M (Epoch median: 246M H100-hours). | Epoch AI | HIGH |
| 2025-08-07 | GPT-5 | Flagship launched at lower price than predecessors; Epoch estimates it used less training compute than GPT-4.5. ~6.6×10^25 FLOP (Epoch CSV, ‘Speculative’, CI 2e25–2e26) vs ~3.8×10^26 for GPT-4.5; $1.25 / $10 per million input/output tokens. | Epoch AI; OpenAI | MEDIUM |
| 2025-10-06 | ChatGPT at 800M weekly users | Consumer AI reaches roughly a tenth of humanity weekly. 800M weekly active users. | OpenAI DevDay via TechCrunch | MEDIUM |
| 2025-11-24 | Claude Opus 4.5 passes 80% on SWE-bench Verified | Autonomous software-engineering benchmark crosses 80%. 80.9% (vendor-reported). | Anthropic | MEDIUM |
| 2026-02 | ARC-AGI-2 above 80% | The benchmark launched in Mar 2025 to replace near-solved ARC-AGI-1 is largely solved within a year. 84.6% (Gemini 3 Deep Think upgrade, ARC Prize-verified, ~$13.62 per task). | ARC Prize via OfficeChai | MEDIUM |
| 2026-03-31 | OpenAI raises $122B at $852B | Largest private funding round on record. $122B at $852B post-money. | OpenAI; Bloomberg | MEDIUM |
| 2026-04-07 | Claude Mythos Preview withheld from general release; Project Glasswing | Anthropic announced its most capable model but restricted it to defensive-security partners because of its cyber capabilities: the first frontier model deliberately withheld from general availability for capability reasons. 12 launch organisations (incl. Anthropic) plus 40+ more; up to $100M in usage credits and $4M in donations to open-source security groups; $25 / $125 per M tokens after credits. | Anthropic, Project Glasswing (opened 12 Nov 2026) | HIGH |
| 2026-04-13 | AI Index 2026: corporate AI investment more than doubles | Stanford HAI measures the 2025 investment surge. Global corporate AI investment $581.7B in 2025 (+130%); private investment $344.7B. | Stanford HAI AI Index 2026 | MEDIUM |
| 2026-06-09 | Claude Fable 5 / Mythos 5 launched; suspended 12 Jun under US export controls, restored 1 Jul | Anthropic released Fable 5 generally and Mythos 5 to Glasswing partners on 9 Jun 2026, suspended both for all customers on 12 Jun after a US export-control directive, and redeployed both on 1 Jul (Mythos 5 for a set of US organisations only). $10 / $50 per million input/output tokens; access suspended for 19 days (12 Jun–1 Jul). | Anthropic launch post with 12 Jun and 1 Jul updates (opened 12 Nov 2026) | HIGH |
| 2026-07 | Perfect scores at IMO 2026 | Several AI systems reported 42/42 at the Shanghai olympiad, saturating the contest as a benchmark. 42/42 reported for multiple systems (trade press). | Trade press via Digital Applied | MEDIUM |
| 2026-08-31 | ChatGPT passes 1 billion weekly users | First AI product above one billion weekly users. 1B+ weekly active users (OpenAI). | OpenAI | MEDIUM |
| 2026-09-01 | SWE-bench Verified saturated | Independent leaderboard stops running the benchmark on new releases. 97.0% (Claude Opus 5, Vals.ai harness). | Vals.ai | MEDIUM |
| 2026-09-01 | Claude Fable 5.1 / Mythos 5.1 | Same model with two safeguard levels: Fable 5.1 generally available, Mythos 5.1 only through trusted-access programmes. Fable 5.1 lists at $10 / $50 per M tokens. | Anthropic, Fable 5.1 / Mythos 5.1 page (opened 12 Nov 2026; page dated September | HIGH |
| 2026-09-03 | GPT-6 Astra: largest estimated training run | Epoch’s largest training-compute estimate to date. ~9.4×10^26 FLOP (Epoch, ‘Likely’; CI ~5e26–2e27), ~45× GPT-4; ≥100,000 GB200s, ~233 MW. | Epoch AI Notable AI Models CSV | HIGH |
| 2026-10-26 | Anthropic files S-1 | First frontier lab to file publicly for an IPO. H1 2026 revenue $16.3B; Q2 2026 first operating profit ($974M). | Anthropic S-1 as reported | MEDIUM |
| 2026-11-06 | OpenAI valued at $1.25 trillion | First private AI lab valued above $1 trillion. First close of ~$11B at a reported $1.25T. | Bloomberg, Reuters as reported | MEDIUM |
Numbers to stop quoting
| Widely repeated | What the evidence supports |
|---|---|
| “The term ‘artificial intelligence’ was coined at the 1956 Dartmouth conference.” | It first appears in the Dartmouth proposal dated 31 August 1955 (McCarthy, Minsky, Rochester, Shannon). The workshop itself ran in summer 1956 — about 18 June to 17 August per Solomonoff’s notes, six weeks in other accounts — and attendance varied; the proposal asked for a ‘2 month, 10 man study’. |
| “The AI winters were 1974–1980 and 1987–1993.” | These are conventions. UK cuts followed the Lighthill report in 1973; DARPA’s cuts came in 1973–74. For the second winter Wikipedia gives 1987–2000 while other histories use 1987–1993. Say ‘roughly’ and name the defining events (DARPA cuts; Lisp-machine collapse). |
| “Hinton invented backpropagation in 1986.” | Rumelhart, Hinton and Williams popularised it for neural networks (Nature, 9 Oct 1986). The method appeared earlier: Linnainmaa’s 1970 master’s thesis (reverse-mode differentiation), Werbos’s 1974 Harvard thesis, Parker (1985). |
| “Minsky and Papert’s ‘Perceptrons’ (1969) killed neural-network research and caused the AI winter.” | It was one factor among several. The 1969 Mansfield Amendment redirected DARPA money to mission-oriented work, and the Lighthill report (1973) hit UK funding. Sources do not establish a single cause. |
| “Deep Blue beat Kasparov in 1996.” | Kasparov won the February 1996 match 4–2 (Deep Blue won one game, on 10 Feb 1996). Deep Blue won the May 1997 rematch 3½–2½, with the decisive game on 11 May 1997. |
| “A chatbot passed the Turing test in 2014 (Eugene Goostman).” | At a University of Reading event on 7 June 2014, 33% of 30 judges were fooled in five-minute chats by a bot posing as a 13-year-old Ukrainian boy. That clears an organiser-chosen 30% bar, not a standard Turing set: his 1950 paper made a prediction (no more than a 70% chance of correct identification after five minutes by about 2000), not a pass criterion. |
| “Humans make 5.1% errors on ImageNet, so AI beat humans in 2015.” | 5.1% is one trained annotator (Andrej Karpathy) on a sample of validation images in 2014; two-thirds of his errors came from not knowing the 1,000 classes. ResNet’s 3.57% (Dec 2015) beat that single estimate, not ‘humans’. |
| “ChatGPT reached 100 million users in two months — the fastest-growing app ever.” | The 100M figure was a UBS estimate of monthly users in January 2023 from Similarweb web-traffic data, not an OpenAI disclosure; OpenAI’s own first 100M figure was weekly users in November 2023. Threads passed 100 million sign-ups in five days in July 2023 — sign-ups, not active users, so the two records are not comparable. |
| “GPT-4 has 1.76 trillion parameters.” | OpenAI has never disclosed it. 1.76T traces to George Hotz’s speculation; Semafor reported ~1T and SemiAnalysis ~1.8T. The mixture-of-experts design is also unconfirmed. Stanford’s AI Index 2026 notes frontier labs have stopped reporting parameter counts. Note that even Epoch’s database stores 1.8T in its Parameters field, explicitly flagged in its notes as a rumour — do not cite Epoch as confirmation. |
| “GPT-4 scored in the top 10% on the bar exam.” | OpenAI’s percentile compared GPT-4 with February Illinois bar takers, a group skewed towards repeat takers. A 2024 re-evaluation (Artificial Intelligence and Law) found a much lower percentile against first-time or all July takers — Live Science summarised it as not breaking the 70th percentile. |
| “AI training compute doubles every 3.4 months.” | That was OpenAI’s 2018 estimate for 2012–2018. Epoch’s longer series gives ~5.7–6 months for the deep-learning era, about 4–5× a year for notable models since 2010 and ~5× a year for frontier language models since 2020. Before 2010 the doubling time was about 20 months. |
| “OpenAI’s o3 solved 25% of FrontierMath.” | 25.2% was OpenAI’s own December 2024 run, probably with more compute or scaffolding. Epoch’s independent test of the released o3 in April 2025 found about 10%. OpenAI had funded the benchmark and had access to many problems, which Epoch disclosed only later. |
| “AlphaGo Zero used 3.41×10^23 FLOP and proves compute grows 10× a year.” | 3.41e23 is OpenAI’s 2018 estimate and counts the compute spent generating self-play games. Epoch’s database now counts only direct network training: 6.5×10^20 FLOP for AlphaGo Zero (‘Confident’) and 3.4×10^20 for AlphaGo Master. Quote the basis with the number; neither figure supports a ’10× a year’ trend claim. |
| “Google paid $500 million for DeepMind.” | Terms were not disclosed. Reports ranged from $400 million (Re/code) to ‘more than $500 million’ (The Information). |
| “XCON saved DEC $40 million a year.” | Most accounts put R1/XCON’s savings at about $25 million a year; $40 million was DEC’s figure for XCON plus related expert systems. |
| “Training frontier models is getting cheaper (AI Index 2026: −30%, ~$120M).” | That figure comes from one secondary summary and could not be checked in the report (hai.stanford.edu unreachable). Epoch’s trends page says frontier language-model training cost has risen ~3.5× a year since 2020, and its data put 2025 runs at $218M–$388M amortised (2023 USD) and Grok 4 at ~$490M nominal. Quote Epoch until the AI Index text is verified. |
| “The US produced 61 notable AI models in 2023.” | 61 is the AI Index 2024 count; the AI Index 2025 restated 2023 as 70. Quote the edition. (2024: 40; 2025: 50 or 59 depending on the 2026 PDF vs web page.) |
| “AI inference costs have fallen 280-fold.” | Stanford’s figure covers GPT-3.5-level capability from $20 (Nov 2022) to $0.07 (Oct 2024) per million tokens; it is not the price of frontier AI. · detail |
| “DeepSeek trained a frontier model for $5.6 million.” | $5.58M was DeepSeek’s stated GPU-rental cost for V3’s final pre-training run only — excluding research, earlier runs, staff and hardware — and is not comparable with Epoch’s ~$490M estimate for Grok 4. |
| “Claude Fable 5 was withdrawn within a week of launch (and is unavailable).” | Anthropic suspended Fable 5 and Mythos 5 on 12 June 2026, three days after the 9 June launch, under a US export-control directive, and restored both on 1 July 2026 (Mythos 5 for a set of US organisations only). Fable 5.1 has been generally available since September 2026. · detail |
Terms used in this index
- Training compute (FLOP)
- Total floating-point operations used to train a model; Epoch AI estimates it from hardware, training time and utilisation, or from parameters and training data.
- Notable model
- A model in Epoch AI’s database that meets its notability criteria (state of the art, highly cited, historically significant or widely used).
- Amortised training cost
- Hardware depreciation plus energy for the final training run, in constant dollars (Epoch AI method).
- Cloud-rental training cost
- The price of renting the same compute from a cloud provider; typically two to four times the amortised cost.
- Constant 2021 dollars
- Values adjusted for inflation to 2021 prices, so years can be compared directly.
- Weekly active users
- People who used a service at least once in a seven-day period; not comparable with monthly active users.
Frequently asked
What is the AI Development Index?
Report AI’s AI Development Index is a dated, sourced record of how AI has developed since 1950, tracked through six measures: training compute, capability (benchmarks), cost, capital, adoption, and risk and resources. It is updated quarterly and the full dataset is free to download as a CSV.
Why not combine the measures into one score?
A single score would need weights that are arbitrary and would hide the fact that the measures move at very different speeds. Keeping them separate lets readers see, for example, that prices for a fixed capability fall while frontier training costs rise.
What is the largest AI training run so far?
Epoch AI’s estimate for OpenAI’s GPT-6 Astra, released in September 2026, is about 9.4×10²⁶ floating-point operations, roughly 45 times GPT-4. Epoch rates the estimate ‘Likely’, with a range of about 5×10²⁶ to 2×10²⁷.
How fast is AI compute growing?
Epoch AI estimates that training compute for frontier language models has grown about 5× a year since 2020 (90% interval 4–6×), and that compute for notable models doubled about every six months after 2010, against about every 20 months before.
How much is invested in AI each year?
The Stanford HAI AI Index 2026 puts global corporate AI investment at $581.7 billion in 2025 in current dollars, of which private investment was $344.7 billion. In constant 2021 dollars, Our World in Data’s series shows corporate investment of about $490 billion in 2025, up from about $17 billion in 2013.
Figures are compiled from company disclosures, regulators, research firms and reputable reporting, and cross-checked against Report AI’s own index pages. Each value carries its as-of date, source and a confidence rating: HIGH where the primary source was read, MEDIUM where it rests on consistent reputable secondary reporting (most figures, because many primary pages cannot be opened from our research environment), DERIVED where it is our own arithmetic, and CONTESTED where credible sources disagree. A year means the calendar year the figure describes; 2026 values are the latest available and marked “to date”. Weekly and monthly user counts, and forecasts and outcomes, are never compared as if they were the same measure. The AI Development Index draws on Epoch AI’s Notable AI Models dataset (downloaded 12 November 2026) for compute, parameters and training costs; Our World in Data’s republication of the Stanford HAI AI Index for investment and model counts; the AI Index for prices, benchmarks, incidents, publications and patents; McKinsey’s Global Survey on AI for organisational adoption; OpenAI for ChatGPT users; and the IEA, LBNL and Gartner for electricity. The decade scoreboard, growth multiples and the 187-fold price fall are Report AI calculations (DERIVED). Values that could not be checked against a primary source in this edition are rated MEDIUM; the AI Index 2026 summary claim of about $120 million for the largest mid-2025 training run is CONTESTED because Epoch’s estimates for 2025 runs are higher. These reports compile and verify secondary data with original analysis; they are not original surveys. See our editorial standards, corrections log and fact-check register.
How AI developed, 1950–2026 (report) · The AI revolution, read through Carlota Perez’s framework · State of AI · Timeline 2022–2026 · State of AI Models & Prices 2026 · State of AI Tokens 2026 · State of AI Finance 2026 · State of AI Usage 2026 · State of AI Infrastructure & Energy 2026 · State of AI Risk 2026 · AI model benchmarks · LLM Token Price Index · AI statistics fact-check · Benchmark · Large language model